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HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY, DEMOGRAPHY, AND THE "PUSH" FACTOR 
IN NORTHERN ETHIOPIAN HISTORY 1916-1935* 
By James Mccann 
Over the course of the last century perhaps the single most 
significant event in· Ethiopia's history has been the extension of 
political and economic power of the Amhara-dominated central state over 
the population and economic resources of Ethiopia's southern peripheries. 
A key component of this process has been the movement of people out of 
the northern and central portions of the old "Abyssinian" empire into the 
south, first as soldier/settlers and then as landlords, administrators, 
and political entrepreneurs. This transplanted population, mostly male' 
and mostly young, made up the flesh and sinew of the imperial state's 
control over the labor, land, and surplus product of the country's rich 
southern provinces. Despite the importance of this population movement we 
have virtually no empirical studies- of the motivations behind the 
emigration, the economic and social conditions the emigrants left behind, 
and the relative effect of "push" versus "pull" factors in their 
decision-making process. 
The purpose of this paper is to document the "push" side of the 
migration equation by examining the political, economic, and demographic 
factors which convinced many young men and some young women to leave 
their homelands in the north and seek a new life in the new frontier of 
southern Ethiopia in the period 1900-35. It is the argument of this paper 
that the material conditions of life in rural northern Ethiopia, 
especially in the northeast, declined precipitously during the first 
third of this century, particularly in the final decade and a half of 
that period. The declining state of the environment, population pressure 
on land, and the imposition of state policies on rural institutions of 
production and distribution pushed many households beyond the break-even 
point in the household production/consumption equation. The long-standing 
formulae within the rural household economy which had sustained the 
social and economic fabric proved unable to deal adequately with the new 
set of demands on it. Patterns of land-holding, labor allocation, and 
institutions of economic distribution changed and new economic strata 
emerged in the society. The end result was a squeezing out of middle 
peasants, the growth of a new class of capital-rich administrators, the 
beginning of the commoditization of land and labor, and an out-flow of a 
huge number of peasants who sought their future elsewhere in Ethiopia's 
emergent political economy. 
The key unit of analysis employed here is the rural household which, 
together with related institutions of distribution, served throughout the 
north as the unit of production, consumption, and social reproduction. By 
focusing on these factors it is possible to trace the effect of national 
and regional policies at the grassroots level, to explain micro-economic 
decision-making, and to appreciate the particular ways in which northern 
Ethiopian peasant society dealt with economic and political crises. The 
structure of the household economy of northern Ethiopia and key rural 
institutions like land tenure, taxation, and capital borrowing are 
accessible through qualitative methods and indicate shifts in relations 
of production. The "push" effect which drove large numbers of people out 
of northern Ethiopia was a direct product of a crisis in the peasant 
household economy brought on by both local conditions of production and 
intervention by the state.l 
Al though the argument in this paper applies generally to northern 
Ethiopia as a whole, my specific focus is on the Las ta region of the 
central highlands. Lasta provides a useful case study for a variety of 
reasons. First, it is an area of the north fairly well isolated from the 
direct effects of the world economy; the area produced little that could 
be sold on the world market, save a trickle of hides and skins. Trade 
from and through Lasta consisted primarily of perishable middle-distance 
goods (butter, spices, honey, and livestock) and bars of salt 
transshipped from salt-flats in Tigre' s eastern lowlands. Production in 
Lasta took place almost exclusively in agricultural households which 
relied on the ox-drawn, single-tine plow used in the cultivation of 
cereals and pulses. Rural institutions of distribution tied households' 
production processes to the state, church, and community. Surplus 
production in Lasta went to support a non-producing class of military and 
ecclesiastical elite who governed locally, supervised the collection and 
redistribution of taxes, and provided for the physical and spiritual 
security of the producer population. 
Lasta provides a useful study for two additional reasons. First, the 
area was governed from 1917 to 1935 by one administrator, Ras Kassa 
Haylu, whose conservative reforms generally reflected the national 
policies of Ras Tafari 's government. State policies which penetrated 
Lasta eventually also reached elsewhere in the north. Second, physical 
and demographic patterns which are now well advanced in all of northern 
Ethiopia were already in evidence in Lasts in the 1916-1935 period. The 
effects of population growth, erosion, loss of pasturage, and land 
fragmentation could be seen in the area's distribution of land, labor, 
and capital. Consequently, the interaction between state policy and the 
physical constraints on the household economy can be assessed and the 
relative effects on emigration determined. 
State Intervention in the Rural North 1916-1935 
Although the process of central state expansion had been in progress 
since Emperor Menilek's accession in 1889, the rise of Ras Tafari 
Makonnan to the position of the head of government in 1916 accelerated 
its pace. In the north, and to a large degree in the south as well, two 
policies dominated imperial state actions. The first was the policy of 
"fiscalism" in which the state attempted to generate its revenue in cash 
from new sources to pay for ambitious new programs in defense and 
infrastructure development. The second overall goal was to break the 
economic and political base of the rural elite in the north who still 
occupied key governorships and dominated local political offices in areas 
like Lasts, Gojjam, Wallo, Tigre, and Bagamder. Both processes were slow, 
but Tafari and his reform-minded supporters were successful in creating 
over the course of the 1920s and the early 1930s the right conditions for 
the penetration of imperial government policy.2 
The eighteen-year administration of Ras Kassa Haylu in Lasta 
(1917-35) provides an excellent example of the role of the state in 
affecting rural relations of production in northern Ethiopia and the 
struggle between the state, local elite, and the peasant population. 
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Together with data on the condition of the household economy, evidence on 
the role of the state in Las ta' s rural economy explain much of the 
background to the large-scale emigration which began from Lasta in the 
period. From the beginning of his governorship in 1917, Ras Kassa Haylu 
had sought to install an effective administrative structure, to 
regularize procedures, and to put in place a loyal cadre of state 
functionaries. Those who disobeyed his direct orders were to receive 
severe punishment of their "soul and body. 113 
Although often couched in religious metaphor, his proclamations were 
clearly intended to break the economic base of the local elite. As with 
the national government, control of customs and market revenues was the 
first order of business. By 1924 he had placed his own nagadrases (market 
heads) along major trade routes and in district markets to take over 
revenue collection from local elites whose loyalty he questioned. In 
those proclamations he specifically excluded local elites from the 
process of collection, although they were to receive a small fixed 
portion of the revenue.4 
As significant as the control of customs and market revenues was, the 
state's determination to affect the distribution of tax income derived 
from local production, the control of which had previously rested almost 
entirely in the hands of local military officers (gult-shum) and 
land-holders (balabbat). One of the earliest recorded proclamations of 
Ras Kassa' s Lasta administration codified the process of redistribution 
which had previously operated at the whim of local elite. Kassa' s edict 
prescribed the exact apportionment of the tax revenues in kind which 
reached Lasta's regional treasury at Lalibala: 
Firstly, divide all the grains collected from every region 
into three sections. Then one-third for the mad-bet 
[kitchen], receiving guests, and for the woman's ration. 
Second, after dividing the remaining two-thirds into four 
sections; three-fourths will be soldiers' rations and the 
rest will be for charity and daily meals for the poor. 
This is to be told to all officials.5 
Even though they were an affirmation of conventional procedures, this 
edict and others reinforced the state's right to determine such matters 
which previously had been left to the local elite. In 1924, Kassa further 
diminished the role of the local elite as conduits for tax collection by 
requiring that peasants deliver grain directly to government 
granaries. 6 Under Kassa' s administration, tax collectors and assessors 
were direct appointees of the state as represented by Kassa' s court in 
Shawa. Local elites received a portion from the surplus product of Lasta 
agriculture, but participated less in its assessment and collection. 7 
Grants of land - an extremely limited resource in Lasta favored 
official state appointees or those of the landed elite who had 
demonstrated their loyalty to the regional government.8 The state's 
power increased accordingly at the grassroots level as those incomes were 
redistributed among loyal followers at descending levels in the 
administrative structure. 
State authority intervened in other domains of the rural elite as 
well, especially in their juridical prerogatives in the form of fines and 
bribes which had provided supplementary income and allowed those holding 
judgeships to garner power in local politics and the distribution of 
factors of production, especially land. Kassa, for example, began his 
governorship in 1917 by appointing judges to sub-district courts only 
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after they had taken a firm oath to abide by a rigid set of procedures 
designed to reduce individual prerogatives. In 1924, he issued a 
four-page proclamation providing explicit instructions to Lasta judges on 
how to conduct court. 9 Together with the regulations on taxation, these 
controls severely circumscribed the traditional rights of local elite and 
effected a transformation in the relationship between those elite and 
rural producers. The state competed with local military and church elite 
for control over revenues, land, and the support of the peasantry. The 
historical terms under which these relations sorted themselves out did 
much to increase the risk factor to peasant household economies. With the 
state control of customs, the judiciary, and key portions of the process 
of redistribution, the rural elite lost the income which had made up an 
important portion of their resources, and the peasant population had lost 
the indirect protection from elite demands which these revenues had 
always provided. 
Changing Demands on Rural Producers 
As a result of the new role of the state in the system of rural 
redistribution, new patterns of surplus transfer and taxation emerged in 
Lasta and all over the north. With major reductions in basic categories 
of income such as the proceeds from customs and lowland tribute, evidence 
suggests that members of the rural elite recouped their losses by 
exploring new ways of deriving revenue from producers. Total collections 
per household increased and changed in type. Based on evidence from 
interviews, archives, and comparative data it is possible to trace both 
qualitative and some quantitative changes in the sorts of demands made on 
peasant producers by the state and rural elite, and therefore comment on 
the political and economic climate in which peasant households sought to 
survive. 
As the basic forms of taxation in northern Ethiopia, the tithe 
(asrat) and land tax (yachaw geber) constituted the ideals against which 
peasants judged other forms of taxation. My reconstruction from oral and 
documentary evidence suggests that the following features were most 
prominent: first, the local official assessed the land tax on community 
units and not on the individual or the household. The descent corporation 
on which they levied a given tax had the responsibility to distribute the 
tax load within the unit. Even though local military officers and the 
hereditary soldier class were exempt from land tax and therefore added to 
the burden on producers, assessments carried out by them nonetheless had 
provided for an accommodation between producers and local administrators. 
Individual households could be assessed according to the size and quality 
of their holdings and the exigencies of individual circumstance might be 
taken into account on a year to year basis.10 The flexibility in this 
assessment system affected the amount of taxes paid, but also increased 
households' sense of security and the ability to manage risk. 
The second important feature of taxation belonged to the collection 
of asrat. As a tithe, this tax was proportional to the annual net yield 
and not a fixed assessment. During interviews covering taxation, Lastans 
regularly named asrat as the foremost and most legitimate levy. Labor 
obligations which formed a part of the dues owed to the landed elite 
usually took place in the local community where they benefited the 
collective spiritual well-being of the community through church-building 
or work on local hudad land whose produce served partially for local 
feasting ceremonies. Finally, peasants paid these taxes in kind or at 
least in salt bars readily available locally. The flexibility of these 
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taxes in kind or at least in salt bars readily available locally. The 
flexibility of these proportionately based taxes proved a critical 
feature in household risk management. 
In the early twentieth century, a plethora of new taxes and 
assessments on produce and labor emerged to change the basic fiscal 
structure of rural society in Lasta. Some of these new demands were 
idiosyncratic and others constituted new permanent taxes collected in new 
forms; some emanated from the state and others from local elites 
attempting to maintain their relative advantage and economic power. Most 
importantly, the new assessments, whether one-time collections or 
permanent, tended to be fixed assessments which therefore overturned the 
fundamental principles of taxation in the rural north. Moreover, new 
labor obligations to support the expanded state administration often took 
Lasta householders away from the local community and collectors demanded 
many oblilgations in cash. The nature of the source material available on 
early twentieth-century Ethiopia makes the exact amount of demand on each 
household impossible to determine, nor can one assess the fluctuations 
from locality to locality or from year to year. The essential point, 
however, is that the fixed rate tax considerably increased the risk 
facing each household, both in material terms (food, seed, and livestock) 
and in the "emic view" of the household itself. 
The shifting pattern of rural taxation in northern Ethiopia actually 
emerged first in 1892 when Menilek attempted to modernize the fiscal 
structure of his new empire-state by ordering that the tithe paid to 
support the local church be transferred to state granaries to maintain 
the army.11 By thus exercising direct control over soldiers' rations 
and the process of collection, the local power of the imperial state grew 
sharply. 
By the end of Menilek's reign, other demands made on peasant 
production had begun to change. Tax rates which had once been set at low 
levels underwent a process of inflation as local and state officials 
competed for revenues. Salt customs rates in the northeast which had been 
one salt bar per camel load of goods in the 1880s had increased 
eight-fold by 1911 despite the overall increase of the price of salt 
relative to silver.12 By the early 1920s, the imperial government had 
taken control of salt revenues; local officials who had lost this income 
passed along the loss to peasants by increasing their demands upon them. 
Over the course of the next two decades, competition over rural revenues 
between the state and local elites intensified and caught peasant 
households in Lasta and in northern Ethiopia as a whole in a precarious 
squeeze which threatened the margin of surplus needed for social and 
physical reproduction of rural society. 
New exactions demanded from northern Ethiopian households in the 
early 1920s were a mixed bag of formal and short-term taxes, labor 
obligations, and judicial fines. These demands fell on households which 
were still required to pay the more traditional - and accepted - tithe 
and land tax. The first of these new taxes was a national one. In 1907, 
Menilek proclaimed that all households in the empire were to pay a one 
taler "telephone" tax to help absorb the expense of implementing the 
first phase of the line linking the empire to the new capita1.13 Unlike 
the existing set of taxes, this assessment was to be paid in cash and on 
the spot. 
Despite these nominal efforts to garner cash from the reluctant 
north, Menilek still financed his infrastructure development largely by 
revenue from imperial control of extractive trade in the south. At first 
these consisted of the imperial duties levied on slaves, and state 
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monopolies on ivory and gold. By Menilek's death in 1913, imperial 
sources of revenue had begun the gradual shift to coffee, hides, and 
marketable foodstuffs. Northern Ethiopia contributed little to the 
imperial coffers and continued to pay their local taxes in kind. By 1919, 
state officials in Lasta were demanding that the rural population pay the 
telephone tax regularly and that the local communities pay fines when the 
region's single telephone link was damaged or vandalized.14 That this 
exaction coincided with a major grassroots rebellion in Lasta should not 
be surprising. Peasants must have wondered what in the world they were 
paying for. The same could have been said in 1921 about the imposition of 
the unheard of "head" taxes in Bagamder and Gojjam.15 
In addition to fixed taxes, northern Ethiopia's peasant producers 
paid an increasing number of special fees to their administrative elite. 
Some of these were traditional ones paid in kind for the celebration of 
feasts on important saints' days or to fete the local gult-shum's family 
during a rite of passage. While these placed burdens on local producers, 
they took place within the local redistributive network. Labor and 
payments in kind were compensated by invitations to feasts, help to a 
loyal household during an off-year, or protection under fictive godparent 
relations. 
The new demands of the 1920s, however, had a different character. 
Collectors demanded payment in cash and they often lavished the benefits 
on their own or state interests outside of the locality. The trappings of 
modernity - rifles, Scotch, high quality cloth, and bribes to higher 
officials - had become expensive. In 1922, for example, Wagshum Kabbada, 
governor of Wag in northern Lasta, announced his intention to travel to 
Mdis Ababa and issued a proclamation calling for the peasantry around 
his capital to contribute to the trip's cost in talers, honey, and other 
portable, non-perishable commodities. He demanded a total of 3000 talers, 
a huge sum for cash-poor Wag peasants to provide.16 Other lower 
officials in Lasta made similar demands when they chose to travel to 
Mdis Ababa to pay homage to Kassa or the imperial court. By the 1930s, 
Last a' s administrative decision-making took place increasingly in the 
capital since Kassa had chosen to remain close to the imperial court. The 
elites of Last a who built houses around Kassa' s Addis Ababa compound in 
the 1920s and '30s supported themselves through collections made back in 
Lasta and transferred to the capita1.17 
Given state-level efforts to systematize the collection and 
distribution of tax revenues, local elite who wanted to maintain or 
increase their own portion of peasant produce had to develop new income 
sources outside state supervision. Their activities are best described 
under the rubric of "corruption. 11 During the 1920s and 1930s, evidence 
suggests that pressures on institutions for the assessment, collection, 
and distribution of taxes, as well as the judicial process, became a 
field for the clandestine accumulation of wealth by rural classes who 
controlled political office. At all levels, officials who participated in 
the political, juridical, and fiscal roles of government squeezed extra 
revenue out of the already overburdened producer population. This 
corruption took many forms. Just as the designation gult-shum had 
entitled one to rights of collection in a particular fief, the holding of 
political office entitled one to the spoils of that position. The process 
began at the lowest levels with chiqashums and dambanya (local tax 
assessors). Ato Alamu Warqnah, a tax assessor in western Lasta in the 
late 1920s, reported bribes and "considerations" as a regular part of his 
income.18 
The tax collection process itself was a major source of corruption 
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and supplementary income for the local elite, especially when state 
officials did not appear as prescribed by Kassa I s edicts. One informant 
described collection procedures at the local state granary where 
collection officials (the chiqashum and dambanya) conspired to collect 
grain beyond the amount of the tithe: 
For tax payments, the delegate would come, delegated by 
the Wagshum. The dambanya would come to the area, or if 
this one was not around, the chigashum. When the compound 
was finished and the granaries made [by peasant labor I, 
the chief of the gult would be there to watch it. It was 
once in many seasons the grazmach or qanyazmach 
[state-appointed officials] were going there. Otherwise it 
was the chief of the district. 
It was there that the engeb [earthenware jar] was filled. 
The enqeb would be filled up to its mouth. After pushing 
down on the grain like this and giving a hard kick with 
the foot, it goes down. He would then say fill it! Again 
it would be filled. With a good measure he would add two 
more measures of grain. The rest of the grain that was 
spilled over would be kept by the grain storekeeper. This 
grain would not be less than ten gunna [c. 20 litres]. 
This one, the chigashum, who keeps the granaries was the 
one who took it. He would take from every type. This man 
was rich and he was a lord. 
This informant, as many others, perceived that the problem was not with 
high officials who lived off regular state incomes, but lower officials 
who had lost their prerogatives in the reform process: 
Of course, there were some who complained when they were 
oppressed too much. Those who lived on farming had to take 
honey, butter, etc. and pay the tax, one out of ten of 
every produce. There were some who complained and some who 
did not. But it was those under the lord who made them 
complain • • • those who take the honey and butter in the 
name of the lord •••• All the areas were under them. 
Everything was according to their wish. They could put you 
in jail, or whip you. They demanded money, grain, sheep, 
and everything else too!l9 
The process of extralegal collections went well beyond the collection 
of the formal taxes. It involved a range of institutional transformations 
which necessarily affected the nature and amount of demands placed on 
rural households as well as the overall distribution of the means of 
production. Office-holding itself was part of the means of accumulating 
revenue. The practice of collecting mashumiya [lit. "that which brings an 
appointment to office] contributed greatly to the incomes of those who 
controlled the power to appoint. In theory the institution was not new. 
Accounts previous to the twentieth century report the presence of a 
prestation to one's superior in recognition of an appointment, usually a 
head of livestock or jar of honey. The remnants of that tradition carried 
into the twentieth century in the form of Yachiqa ~• the payment made 
by the local bailiff to his superior on his assumption of duties. By the 
1920s in northern Ethiopia, however, offices often went· to the bidder 
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offering the highest mashumiya payment. Payment came to be expected in 
silver and the rights to collect it from one's subordinates became an 
accepted prerogative of local office. Predictably, an inflationary spiral 
in fees followed and those with access to cash held the inside track to 
local office. 20 In the competition between state-appointed and local 
officials (many appointees enjoyed both designations), new avenues for 
extorting cash and income from local communities proliferated. Judges 
from the local to the regional level were in the best position to 
benefit; Ras Kassa's attempts to codify judicial procedure sought, 
largely in vain it seems, to prevent corruption, Cash payments, or at 
least gifts of livestock or honey, were expected if a litigant were to be 
successful in land disputes or civil hearings. Crimes like murder, 
slave-trading, or failure to appear in court carried cash fines of from 9 
to 80 talers. Fines and confiscation of a felon's property could reach up 
to the fourth genealogical line. Distant relations could be asked by the 
court to pay one taler each on behalf of their kin. 21 Because of poor 
accounting methods, rural judges could appropriate any or all of their 
collections. Supplicants to local officials had to make payments in cash 
or kind to receive a hearing and Kassa' s appellate courts were to.o 
distant to offer much help. Most judicial procedures in fact took place 
at the sub-district level where local elite influence was the greatest. 
Northern Ethiopians returning from military service in Tripoli, trade 
expeditions to Eritrea, or target labor in Sudan regularly paid cash to 
local officials for the right to pass through their territory or to 
resume their place in the local land division. To a large degree, the 
Italian, French, and British reports of brigandage along the eastern 
trade routes to Eritrea were extra-legal collections of duties by local 
judges and office-holders.22 
Legitimate court proceedings had also shifted into the cash economy. 
Verdicts in all types of criminal cases increasingly required cash 
payment of fines and constituted an important source of revenue for state 
coffers and official incomes. In 1933, for example, a bloody border 
skirmish between a Lasta village and one in Yajju resulted in a seven 
taler per capita fine on all of the villages involved. 23 According to 
both oral and documentary sources, cash fines increased in frequency and 
in the amount of payment during the 1920s and early 1930s. 
A useful example of the expansion of judicial procedures designed to 
generate money for state purposes was the institution of afarsata. In 
this procedure, a village harboring a felon could be held accountable for 
producing the criminal on pain of a large fine levied on the community as 
a whole. State-appointed representatives conducted the proceedings and 
received a portion of the fine in payment as well as food and drink from 
the local population for the duration of the procedure. Major crimes 
punishable through afarsata were animal theft, slave raiding, cutting the 
tendons of a slave, robbery, murder, house-burnings, and assault. Fines 
claimed by a plaintiff or assessed by the court for a particular 
infraction were often considerably less than the total fine assessed on a 
community which was unable or unwilling to produce a culprit; the state 
and its local representatives kept the difference. 
While recognized in traditional jurisprudence in Lasta and other 
areas of the north, the use of afarsata in the 1920s shifted from 
criminal prosecution to revenue generation. Over the course of the decade 
and a half from 1920 to 1935, officials invoked the method to prosecute 
lesser crimes and the frequency of occurrence increased dramatically. 
This was partially because the total amount of fine paid was always 
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greater in cases where the connnunity could or would not produce the 
criminal. The procedure was an extremely popular one in imperial circles 
and formed a major part of the judicial program of Ras Kassa in Lasta and 
Ras Emru, the imperial representative in Wallo (1928-1932) and Gojjam 
(1932-1935). The institution proved particularly effective at squeezing 
currency out of cash-poor areas in the north which otherwise yielded tax 
revenues only in kind. Evidence from Lasta indicates that the use of 
afarsata had become not just a judicial procedure, but also a source of 
revenue for local representatives of the state. Ras Kassa recognized the 
trend as dangerous to the economic stability of the subject population. 
In 1924, Ras Kassa issued a proclamation which effectively reduced the 
number of officials legally empowered to initiate the procedure, citing 
the need to reduce the frequency of the procedure. Oral sources suggest 
that his edict was ineffective and afarsata continued as a means for 
local officials to supplement income over and above their state-granted 
allowances. 24 With institutions of this type as regular fare of the 
local state administration, peasant households obviously felt the threat 
of sudden demands on their household resources. 
For a cash-poor imperial government, peasant corvee labor also 
provided an important resource which provided concrete results at a 
minimal cost to the state. In addition to payments of tax, tribute, and 
fines, the labor power of the rural population was also a source of 
competition between local requirements and state demands. Peasant 
households in Lasta and northern Ethiopia fulfilled a number of labor 
obligations to the local connnunity, including the building and repair of 
churches, the cultivation of church land, the building and repair of 
houses for the local elite, and the clearing of local roads for special 
occasions. There is good evidence that the imperial state and its 
representatives expanded these obligations to the local connnunity by 
involving peasant labor in building a permanent infrastructure designed 
to support the political economy of a modernizing state. Much of this 
process concentrated in areas producing directly for the world market. In 
Las ta and environs the demands were modest, but nevertheless impinged 
upon the limited pool of labor time available outside of the agricultural 
cycle. Households along major trade arteries felt most of the effect as 
they were called upon to repair and maintain the roads already existing 
and to build new ones designated by imperial planners in the capital. 
Between 1928 and 1935, peasant labor built roads from Addis Ababa to 
Dase, from there to Koram, and from Yajju to Lalibala.25 
Building roads was a complete social process which involved household 
resources in labor from male and female members as well as food reserves 
to feed the supervising officials. Ato Chakola Lannna recalled the process 
along the rocky canyons between the market towns of Saqota and Koram: 
The wood and stone would be placed in a proper way and the 
bumps would be filled by soil and the area cleared. It was 
said that the road was cleared when the Wagshum came, when 
he was going from Saqota to Koram or Koram to Saqota, the 
road would be cleared. Although it was not like today with 
well chopped stones and wooden poles and cement, it was 
fine. 
It was the rural people who were working. The army never 
lifted a finger. The soldiers only followed their 
officers, it was the people who worked. While [the men] 
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cleared, "the women' baked bread. Honey would be taken, 
butter would be taken; sheep, beer and many other things 
when the Wagshum's arrival was known.26 
The organization of road-building to some extent replicated the 
work involved in the cultivation of state lands (hudad) in Lasta. 
Here the work of plowing, cultivating, weeding, and feeding the 
workforce involved the labor of all members of the household. The 
timing of both of these factors was critical since each household 
was keenly aware that their own productivity depended on the 
timeliness of plowing and sowing. 
Thus by the late 1920s and early 1930s, the fiscal demands on 
the peasant household had altered considerably from a few decades 
before. Not only had taxes, demands on labor, and extra-legal 
drains on cash supply increased, but they had done so in ways 
which considerably increased the risks to the household economy. 
As a result of the struggle between the state and local elites the 
overall rate of taxation and tribute collection had increased. 
More importantly, the types of new exactions had changed; the 
proportional asrat tax made up a smaller portion of the overall 
drain on household income. Fixed taxes, payable in cash, and 
unpredictable fines and levies now dominated the revenue 
transferred from peasant producer to administrative elite (whether 
local elite or the state - Lasta's peasant population could hardly 
have noted much of a distinction). This shift in the type of 
tax/tribute, independent of the overall increase of assessment, 
seriously affected the stability of the household economy as well 
as challenging the ideology of subsistence and risk management 
which dominated the rural population.27 
Table 1 suggests in abstract terms the effects of a shift from 
proportional to fixed assessments. In agricultural systems 
dominated by unstable production conditions (weather, pests, 
access to means of production) like Lasta, fixed taxes 
considerably increased the chances of a production unit falling 
below the amount of food required to reproduce its labor supply 
and to fulfill social obligations to the community.28 Under a 
system of fixed taxes, high levels of production provided a higher 
level of after-tax surplus than under a proportional tax system 
like the asrat. At lower yields, however, the fixed tax cut more 
quickly into surplus. Proportional taxes, by contrast, required 
higher net payments during good years, but were less likely to 
produce deficits after a poor harvest, and produce less severe 
shortfalls when they did. Thus while the total after-tax surplus 
of a household in a random five year cycle of production yields 
may be higher under a system of fixed taxes, the risk in any one 
year would be considerably greater than under a system of 
proportional taxes. The risk to a single household of not 
producing sufficient surplus to reproduce its labor supply or to 
continue as a production unit therefore significantly increased 
under a tax system which emphasized fixed payments. 
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Table 1 
Comparative Effect of Proportional and Fixed Assessments 
on Peasant Income and Subsistence 
Asrat (10% proportional 
tax) 
Remainder after taxes 
Surplus or deficit based 
on subsistence rate of 30*" 
Fixed tax of 5 madeiia 
Remainder after taxes 
Surplus or deficit based 
on subsistence rate of 30 
Mixed tax of asrat plus 
fixed rate of 5 madeiia 
Remainder 
Surplus or deficit based on 





















































*Madeiia is a unit of grain measurement equivalent to c. 32 liters. 
**Subsistence rate of 30 madeiia per household is based on 1937 calculation by 
Vinigi Grottanelli in the Lake Tana district southwest of Lasta. 
Demography and Household Economy as "Push" Factors 
Beyond the effects of the direct intervention of the state in local 
affairs after 1916, changing conditions for production and reproduction 
in Lasta had a major role in pushing Lastans out of their homeland. The 
available evidence seems to argue that agricultural productivity in Lasta 
decreased during 1920-1935 in some years and in some areas at an 
alarming rate. While we have no quantified data, my research on the 
conditions of production in Lasta makes a clear case for this position. 
The decline can be seen in terms of produce per unit of land, in output 
per unit of labor, and in output per production unit (the household). 
A primary cause for declining productivity was the population 
pressure on land which pushed cultivation onto new, previously 
uncultivated land above 3000 meters, areas in lowland valleys below 2500 
meters, and on to the precarious slopes of Lasta' s ubiquitous canyons. 
Land in these areas simply did not produce as effectively as had the 
ideal zones of first occupation. The danger of frost higher up and floods 
in the lowland valleys made them high-risk investments of labor and seed. 
Moreover the crops grown in zones such as barley in the highland areas 
and sorghum in the lowland valleys were socially less desirable than the 
tef grown in the 2500 -3000 meter zone.29 
Increasing demand for land in the ideal middle zone and the nature of 
the land distribution system meant an increasing fragmentation and 
scattering of plots. 30 The pressure on fertile land also prompted Las ta 
farmers to reduce fallow periods; while Lasta farmers knew its value, 
fallowing came to be viewed as an unaffordable luxury.31 In the rush to 
till all available land, including forested areas, land-poor farmers put 
forest and scrub areas under the plow, thus reducing firewood sources, 
eliminating forage for livestock, and inducing erosion of the unterraced 
hillsides. These factors of environmental damage were cumulative and 
lowered yields as well as optimism about the future.32 
These conditions had the immediate effect of intensifying the labor 
demands on the household economy in Lasta and the long-term effect of 
bringing about further stratification among rural producers. New demands 
on household labor included the additional labor required to break ground 
in areas which were not only difficult to cultivate because of elevation, 
but also because of the steep slopes which imperiled the plowman and his 
oxen. Breaking new ground was extremely arduous, exhausting work for man 
and animal. Proper preparation of the soil for planting tef, for example, 
required at least five passes to prepare the soil for sowing. If a farmer 
tried to spare his oxen he risked poor yields. On the other hand, by 
exhausting oxen on breaking new soils, a cultivator sacrificed efficiency 
in tilling his remaining plots, since tired and malnourished oxen perform 
significantly less well than fresh and well fed ones.33 
The strains of decreasing land and capital resources were not evenly 
distributed between households or within households. Needless to say, 
poor and middle peasants felt the effects more than capital rich ones. 
New plots located on the periphery of settled zones as well as nearby 
fragnented plots each required additional time and effort spent in 
transporting equipment, seed, and oxen to the site. Distant plots could 
not be easily protected except by having younger household members 
encamped nearby. At harvest, crops had to be transported to a central 
point for threshing and winnowing and then again carried to regional 
granaries. All told, labor required per unit of land increase·d 
significantly. Decreased fallowing and the poor soil quality of newly 
cultivated areas required much more labor than larger plots and well 
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rested soil. Weeding time increased on poorly prepared 
and more pasturage put under the plow, households 
invested significantly more labor in maintaining 
especially oxen. 
ground. With more 
if they could -
livestock herds, 
It is possible also to speculate that women's work expanded as a 
direct result of the expansion of cultivation and land fragmentation. 
Homesteads in new areas often were located far from water sources. The 
clearing of forest and scrub also increased the time spent in search of 
firewood; the choice of using dung for fuel instead of as fertilizer or 
for covering floors and household equipment would have been a difficult 
one. Young members of the household fed livestock by the labor-intensive 
"lopping browse" which meant ranging far from the homestead in search of 
bush and foliage which was then chopped and hand-fed to livesotck. 
Labor costs to the Lasta household in this period therefore grew 
sharply, and the ration of household workers to consumers (young children 
and older infirm members were consumers only) became a critical factor. 
With the decreasing quality and quantity of land available in Lasta the 
situation paralleled Chayanov's data for peasant farm organization in 
Russia: "The peasant restrained in its land area forces up its labor 
intensity ••• however, this is achieved at the cost of reducing the payment 
per labor unit which requires that the farm's equilibrium be established 
at a lower level of well being. 1134 Households with a low 
worker-to-consumer ration either bad to intensify the work of able 
members or cease to be an economically viable unit of production. In 
general, this meant households early in the development cycle (a young 
couple with children) or in a later stage (a single household head whose 
mature children have moved away) operated on the margin of viability. 
In Lasta, population pressure on land and the decrease in the land's 
productivity brought on precisely the type of intensification of labor 
and decrease in material welfare described by Chayanov. Households faced 
with this squeeze had either to expand their land holdings or accept the 
conditions of more labor and less food. Obviously, most households ended 
up accepting the latter condition. The case of those who were able to 
expand their land holdings will be taken up later. 
The increasing amount of labor required to maintain Lasta households 
accounts in great measure for the continued demand for slaves in the 
northern rural. economy. Unlike family labor, kin, or Amhara itinerants, 
· slaves had few opportunities to establish independent production units, 
making them more likely to remain with one household and thus a more 
reliable source of labor. Central government prosecution of the slave 
trade and closing of the southern frontiers in the 1920s and 1930s had 
cut off the supply of slaves to Lasta and the north, raising their price, 
and forcing Last a' s workforce to rely on those already present in the 
workforce. With increasing prices and the worsening of labor conditions 
on small-scale peasant holdings, however, many slaves took advantage of 
the new anti-slavery regulations and left their masters. Many attached 
themselves to wealthy households which could provide protection from 
their former master's claims and which offered better conditions for 
their labor. Still others who left their homes took refuge at the 
compound of the anti-slavery court at Dabra Tabor set up by Ras Kassa 
after 1930. After experiencing the poor conditions and inadequate food 
supplies of the court, many escaped slaves in the 1920s and 1930s chose 
to join local governors and state officials as "contract" laborers 
referred to locally as YaSar Barya (lit. "grass slaves"). Many slaves did 
remain with their masters, but the shift of large numbers of slaves from 
middle peasant households to those of the rich and powerful paralleled 
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the movement of other means of production in the same direction.35 
Questions of labor, however, were part of a larger production 
equation. In Las ta' s production system it was capital and not land or 
labor per se which determined the ability of the individual household to 
amass the means of short-term survival and the reproduction of its labor 
in the long run. The labor power of oxen was the scarcest factor of 
production in Lasta and northeast Ethiopia as a whole.36 Without owning 
oxen or having access to them, land had little meaning; claims not plowed 
quickly reverted to those with sufficient draft power to put them into 
production. Both in the social categories perceived by local cultivators 
and in terms of the actual control of the means of production, ownership 
of oxen determined economic status: a poor peasant was one with less than 
a yoke of oxen, a middle peasant had at least one yoke, and a rich 
peasant or member of the elite would have had several pair, or even 
more.37 
The evidence from Lasta during the 1920s, 1930s, and into the 
post-war period suggests that the practice of poor households lending 
land in exchange for use of capital (called Magazo) grew in importance to 
the rural system of distribution. The effect, though, was not to balance 
control of capital among and between strata, but to exacerbate class 
differences and allow richer peasants and officials to accumulate land 
and labor through their control of capital. At the foundation of this 
process was the fact that ownership of oxen proved far more efficient 
means of cultivation than access through borrowing. Borrowers could not 
be choosers, and owners of oxen invariably made sure that their oxen 
worked prime plowing days on their own land. Plowing and sowing too late 
reduced yields and required more time of exhausted animals. Recent 
research in northern Ethiopian farming systems has shown a direct 
correspondence between the number of oxen actually owned, as opposed to 
borrowed, and the number of actual plowing days available per 
household.38 A simple corollary to this evidence would argue that the 
lower the number of oxen actually owned, the less land cultivated and the 
lower the total household production. 
In Lasta where conditions for the household reproduction of cattle 
were difficult because of topography and vanishing pasturage, the 
opportunity costs of engaging in agriculture grew considerably as oxen 
became more time-consuming to feed and maintain and the cost of borrowing 
more dear.39 The overall effect of the decreasing quality and 
nourishment of oxen owned by Lasta peasant households and the difficulty 
of access to alternative means of plowing parallels conditions described 
for Russian empirical studies: 
- if there is a deterioration in the type [or quality] of 
draught animals used, there cannot be the slightest doubt 
that the general maintenance of the animals and the 
treatment of the soil, as well as the food and living 
conditions of the farmer have likewise deteriorated •••• 
the harder the animals are worked and the worse they are 
fed, the harder the peasant works and the worse he is 
fed.40 
There is no question that with fragmentation of plots, unproductive 
new land brought under cultivation, and the shortage of forage, that the 
conditions for Lasta's oxen population, and production in general, 
deteriorated. The conditions which promoted the cycle of impoverization 
cited above also stimulated a reciprocal, but much smaller, cycle of 
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enrichment whereby wealthy peasants and office holders expanded their 
control over the means of production through the manipulation of changing 
rural institutions. The two cycles complemented one another: capital-poor 
households sought to maintain themselves by ceding land use rights and 
labor in exchange for oxen from richer households. Even in years with 
poor harvests, wealthy peasants and the administrative elite could obtain 
surplus food through loaning their draft animals. Office holders, a class 
which included the state, the church, and local elite, insulated 
themselves from the effects of declining productivity by living off fixed 
assessments of labor, food, and cash. Even when their own animals 
succumbed to epizootic disease, both state officials and local elites 
enjoyed "rights in draft power" which allowed them to claim the use of 
peasant animals on their own lands. Through this means and access to the 
judicial and tax assessment systems, the elite effectively controlled the 
distribution of the means of production in the rural political economy. 
On the basis of the above evidence, one could argue that two systems 
of agriculture evolved in Lasta during the environmental and economic 
crises of the ·1916-1935 period and beyond. One set of peasants, 
relatively wealthy in the means of production and fallowing properly, 
relied on its own draft power, attracted free and slave labor, and even 
engaged in rudimentary cash-cropping of cereals and pulses. 38 A second 
system depended to an increasing degree on the use of borrowed capital, 
lent out its land through Magazo, and subsisted on low yields of grain 
from poorly cultivated and seldom fallowed plots. This latter group 
worked harder and were in a poor position to recruit labor. Peasant 
households at the lower end of the spectrum had difficult choices to 
make; they could choose either to intensify their own labor to maintain 
subsistence with decreasing productivity, or seek additional income 
outside of household-based agriculture. Those households near major 
markets or trade routes did so by engaging in petty trade or selling food 
to caravans. This situation, however, was by no means a socio-economic 
structure at equilibrium, but rather one in a downward spiral where the 
means of production fell increasingly into the hands of the rural elite 
and their allies among upper peasants.42 
Understanding the cycle of enrichment which emerged in the midst of 
general economic decline requires a careful scrutiny of the process by 
which the administrative class accumulated productive resources. If the 
basis of rural stratification in Lasta was control of oxen and their 
labor power, the control of land nevertheless serves as a useful 
indicator of the distribution of factors of production. While the equal 
distribution of land was an important tenet of the land tenure system, 
and one of the core symbols of Las ta rural producers' moral economy, 
changes in the system took place during 1916-1935 which resulted in 
patterns of landholding directly benefiting the upper class.43 
In Lasta's property system, land could be alienated from a hereditary 
land-holder (restenya) only in certain specific circumstances. The most 
important of these were treason, non-payment of taxes, and abandonment of 
land. In the case of the latter, members of the rural military class 
retained a long-standing right to occupy land which restenya households 
had abandoned. Through the lending of oxen and seed, capital-rich tenants 
also had a de facto means to alienate land by claiming its use through 
their superior capability of cultivating it.44 
On the basis of available qualitative data, I have concluded that 
during 1920-1935 rural elites in Lasta and northern Ethiopia 
significantly expanded their control of land resources. This process took 
place partially because of their control of land courts, the need (and 
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ability) of the state to settle its new representatives on the land, and 
the need for poor and middle peasants to transfer their traditional land 
rights in exchange for access to oxen, seed, and food. Perhaps the most 
significant source of land transfer in the period was the ability of the 
military and administrative elite to take over land abandoned by Lasta 
households which had failed as viable production units and had left the 
area (see below). 45 The episodic political and economic crises of the 
period, in fact, sped up the transfer of land from poor and middle 
peasants to rich ones and to the administrative elite.46 
The imperial state was aware of the trends in landholding and even 
participated in it. Administrative reforms emanating from the central 
government or Ras Kassa's court required new personnel to implement them. 
New officials invariably received grants and rights of collection which 
lent added pressure to already overcrowded districts. Some even received 
lands outside of Lasta. In 1924, for example, Kassa's records contain a 
note on a grant of 10 gasha of land (c. 400 hectares) to a minor official, 
"in addition to what you already have in Lasta." His son Dajach 
Wandbawassan received a similar amount in Lasta when he took the 
governorship.47 These officials and the local elite they replaced 
competed to expand land holdings through both official prerogatives and 
traditional mechanisms. In fact, evidence from documents and interviews 
suggests that the enlargement of their own land holdings through the 
manipulation of local privilege formed part of the way in which non-state 
elite resisted attempts by the central government to undermine their 
wealth and social position. 
Yet state representatives such as Wagshum Kabbada (governor of the 
Wag region north of Lasta from 1917-1935) engaged in it also. One 
informant reported that his father had taken the Wagshum to court in 
Saqota, Dase, and Addis Ababa to fight confiscation of his land. He 
described the local reaction to the Wagshum's attempts to extend his land 
holdings and that official I s poor knowledge of local procedures for 
claiming land: 
My father had made him [the Wagshum] come to Dase two times and to 
Addis Ababa two times, because unless he showed his birthright, 
unless he recounted his descent, he could not take the land by force. 
"You [Wagshum) won't cultivate the land unless you have counted your 
lineage! Whose son was your father Wagshum Tafari? Whose son was 
Tafari? Tafari was the father of Kabbada, Haylu was the son of 
Kabbada, Sehaynash was the daughter of Haylu. How were they descended 
from ancient time? 11 
He [the Wagshum] did not know because he had been living in Addis 
Ababa, Wallaga, Gama Gofa and other places. Because of this he had no 
case and was worried •••• When he refused [to answer], and wanted to 
take it by force, the people would refuse. He was made to come [to 
the capital] once, twice, three times!48 
Most rural cultivators did not have the means to mount such a 
challenge and lost ·their land, but enough petitions and complaints 
reached the imperial court to prompt action. In 1928 the newly crowned 
Negus Tafari issued orders to restrict the confiscation of hereditary 
rest land to cases of treason against the royal family.49 There is 
little evidence, however, that the decree altered the accumulation of 
land by the rural elite. 
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Similar signs could be discerned in the uses of labor as well. 
Traditional rights of corvee labor underwent a transformation as both 
local officials and the state made demands on the peasant labor pool, as 
discussed. Households living on the margins of solvency not only had to 
fulfill normal corvee obligations and to transport their own taxes to 
government granaries, but they also regularly exchanged labor in return 
for access to oxen, seed, or food. Such labor could have been 
agricultural work on wealthy neighbors' plots, or sheqela (lit. "to 
carry") demeaning day labor previously the province of slaves. 
Increasingly, destitute farmers competed with landless ex-slaves, the 
other component of the free labor pool. By the post-war period, new 
sections in markets had appeared where poor highland farmers offered 
their labor in exchange for food or, after 1941, cash. Some households 
managed to avoid sheqela labor by taking up petty trade, brigandage, or 
simply by tightening their belts and accepting life closer to the edge of 
penury.SO 
Disequilibrium in Las ta' s rural society was already evident by 1917 
when bad harvests prompted banditry and the resistance to Wagshum 
Kabbada 1 s appointment as governor of Wag. During that same period Ras 
Kassa received complaints from Lasta churches which asked for additional 
land allotments to feed increasing numbers of residents dependent on 
church charity. In 1924 the ras took action against the growing numbers 
of indigent peasants who endangered trade and public security. One 12 
September 1924 he issued a proclamation: 
It has been the rule [in Lasta] not to allow any person in 
the territory who is a stranger to live without a 
guarantor. In recent years it has become known that the 
number of thieves and bandits have increased. This 
condition has given rise to gatherings which have 
disrupted trade and farming. Thieves and robbers are 
usually jobless or idle persons. Therefore a complete 
census should be taken and the population should be 
recorded in the judges' register. Peasants who do not 
farm, traders who do not trade, soldiers who are not known 
by their commanders, priests who do not preach or teach, 
and artisans who do not engage in their work are 
considered idle. Anyone who allows such idle persons to 
live on his land is considered to be harboring the bandits 
and therefore is responsible for the property lost [during 
robberies or raids]. Nevertheless, if anyone hands over 
idle people to the judge, he is entitled to receive half 
of the fine assessed to the criminat.51 
The "idle" persons Kassa acted against and those who converged on the 
church compounds asking for ecclesiastical largesse were products of a 
rural economy unable to support an increasing population on decreasing 
productivity. 
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Household Choices and the Formation of Empire: 
Rebellion, Pauperization, and Emigration 
The economic and political conditions described in the previous 
sections offered a series of unpleasant choices for Las ta' s peasant 
households. The demands of the state and new strategies of the local 
elite together with the difficult conditions for production pushed them 
close to or beyond the threshhold of subsistence. In 1917-1919 and 
1928-1930 many Lastans and northern Ethiopians opted for rebellion, the 
results of which only intensified the level of state intervention.52 
For others, especially those operating closest to the margins of 
subsistence, the only path was to enter into a relation of direct 
dependence on the largesse and capital resources of the small wealthy 
class. 
Neither of these strategies worked very effectively for the vast 
majority of Lasta households. Rebellion profited only those few of the 
military class who retained booty from raids or government reprisals. The 
new class of wealthy administrators was much too small to absorb all the 
households tottering on the margins of economic viability. In these 
circumstances, it is not surprising that many young Lastans and northern 
Ethiopians turned to labor migration or emigration as solutions to the 
economic decline of their homeland.53 
By 1920, Lasta was not a closed system but existed as a part of a 
larger imperial whole and a regional economy which offered the population 
some new options for coping with the weakness of the northern household 
economy choices which presented themselves to the well off and 
destitute alike. The north-south migration which took place in Ethiopia 
between 1890 and the post-war years was perhaps the most significant 
single process in the foundation of the modern Ethiopian social 
formation. Menilek's conquests meant little without a ready population of 
soldier/settlers willing to leave the cycle of subsistence production in 
the north and settle into the huge tracts of alienated land offered in 
the wake of the imperial conquests. Primitive accumulation in the form of 
saleable land, labor from slaves and serfs, and the support of state 
power brought on a rapid growth of commodity production in coffee, hides 
and skins, foodstuffs, and labor.54 The inexorable movement of men, 
sometimes women, and even entire households out of northern rural society 
and into national economic and political life provided the human side of 
the imperial presence in southern Ethiopia and therefore the foundation 
of the modern Ethiopian empire-state. For Lasta, the relocation of a 
large part of its population into the southern economy represented its 
most important contribution to modern Ethiopia. 
The basic outlines of the northerners' roles in southern Ethiopia in 
the early twentieth century Ethiopia are becoming fairly well known, 
particularly from the perspective of southern land systems.55 What has 
remained unexamined in the literature is the exact nature of the "push" 
factors out of the north, the effect on those who remained behind, and 
the relative size of the southern movement as against internal migration, 
target labor, and the movement into adjacent colonial economies. The 
latter point is especially relevant since northern Ethiopians, including 
many from Lasta, chose a whole range of avenues from permanent emigration 
to short-term wage labor. 
Migration was by no means an entirely 
northern Ethiopian household economy. 
landholding and property systems promoted 
new process in Lasta or in the 
In fact, the Amhara/Tigrean 
the breaking up of family land 
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and property estates upon the death of the household head or the economic 
collapse of the household unit. In the natural, and expected, development 
cycle of a rural Lasta household, young men and women left their natal 
households and sought to establish their own independent production unit 
through marriage, procreation, and labor recruitment. Moreover, the 
nature of the rest land system encouraged new land claimants to move away 
from the homestead and parish of their parents in order to activate land 
claims in other areas not yet exploited by other members of their 
cognatic descent group.56 Lasta peasants, like their Amhara/Tigrean 
counterparts elsewhere in the north, were not legally bound to the- land, 
nor to local administrative elites. Tax and labor obligations belonged to 
the land itself and to those who occupied it at any given time. As Donald 
Crummey has pointed out in his insightful work on early 
nineteenth-century rural society, man was free and land the taxpayer.57 
The movement of the rural population within Lasta was therefore an 
anticipated part of the normal life cycle of a young person and of the 
household unit itself. 
The timing of household development cycles varied according to the 
ecological, economic, and even political climate in which they produced. 
In ideal conditions, young people routinely left their homes to improve 
their status and prospects for setting up an independent household of 
their own. For young men the attractions were hunting, raiding, or 
attaching themselves to the household and fortunes of a wealthy official. 
Young women had fewer options, although they had the option of joining a 
successful household where conditions for their labor might be better. 
Criminals or even those falsely accused of crimes often resorted to 
flight rather than facing the consequences of their crimes locally. Since 
relatives up to the fourth collateral line could be held liable for 
fines, close kin often accompanied the escapee to a new life on the 
frontier where a man or woman's past mattered less than their 
adaptability to a new situation. 
In his research on a southeastern Tigre village in the 1960s, Bauer 
noted six reasons why a household might decrease in wealth and face 
dispersal: 
1) crop failure requiring borrowing 
2) death of an ox 
3) theft of oxen 
4) losses in trade 
5) destruction of stored grain [for example, by fire or vermin] 
6) loss of a court case [or confiscation by political authority]. 
When household control of the means of production, especially capital and 
land, fell too low, the unit broke up and members dispersed.58 Even in 
the most economically viable of households a tension existed between the 
household head who sought to retain the younger members within the unit 
and the young people's desires to establish their own independent 
households as soon as they could accumulate the requisite means of 
production. Many of these conditions occured even in the best of times 
and were expected eventualities in the normal course of rural life; rural 
institutions grew up around the principle of avoiding the risks involved. 
Political conditions such as warfare and heavy tax assessments 
potentially increased risks as did the deterioration of the environment. , 
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Patterns of Emigration 
There is good historical evidence that the deterioration of political 
conditions and the environment had already created difficult 
circumstances in northeast Ethiopia before the opening of the twentieth 
century. Here the evidence includes Lasta but goes beyond to describe 
processes going on in much of northern Ethiopia. The major trend, though 
not the only one, was for northern migrants to move south into the 
emerging center of Shawa. In the early years of Menilek's reign as negus 
of Shawa, a key cadre of his troops consisted of the remnants of Emperor 
Tewodros 's Gondar army which had fled south after the Tigrean Yohannes 
had taken the throne. 59 Some of these were certainly Lastans. Nor did 
the north-south movement necessarily end up as far south as Shawa. During 
the violence and disruption of the war with Egypt in Eritrea and Tigre, 
peasants from Hamasen moved south into Wag and fought with the population 
there before settling down on the land. 60 The movement out of Tigre 
into Wag, Lasta proper, Gondar, and further south accelerated in the late 
nineteenth century as a result of the shift of the political center but 
also because of the advanced state of erosion, deforestation, and capital 
shortages in the aging northern production system. By 1900, Tigrean 
migrants had pushed their language and political influence deeply into 
Wag and had penetrated even further south along the southern caravan 
route toward Shawa. That many of the Tigrean migrants came as petty 
merchants and entrepreneurs indicated the extent to which their 
environment had driven them from reliance on agriculture.61 During and 
after the great famine of 1889-1892, huge numbers of northern Ethiopian 
migrants made their way to the coast or the western border area in search 
of food, better land, and opportunities to generate income outside of 
agriculture.62 
Al though part of an on-going process, the emigration of Las tans 
during 1916-1935 accelerated precipitously as a direct result of 
political, economic, and environmental circumstances already described. 
As fewer households managed to weather the pressures on land and the 
demands on their income they sought to supplement agricultural production 
by engaging in petty trade. A destitute farmer might offer his labor to a 
neighbor in exchange for seed or the use of a yoke of oxen. Others raised 
capital from local usurers and went to Tigre to buy salt or manufactured 
goods to trade locally. Still others collected hides and skins for sale 
to the depressed markets in Asmara, Waldiya, or Dase. While Tigre 
remained unattractive for agriculture, it did possess the rudiments of a 
cash-based economy based on its role in the salt trade and proximity to 
the colonial economy of Eritrea. Cash, when returned to Lasta, could buy 
scarce commodities: seed, oxen, or even access to land.63 Wag and Tigre 
farmers in particular relied on the income derived from trade to augment 
the meager produce of the land. 64 More fertile areas of Lasta adjacent 
to the Takkaze valley absorbed new populations seeking arable land. 
Documents from the region suggest that many destitute householders 
sought refuge in one of the only rural institutions capable of providing 
support in times abject need, the Orthodox church. During 1920-1935, the 
population of church lands grew and demands for support from the church 
patrimonies increased dramatically. Local churches responded by 
petitioning the governor for additional lands and grain allocations. 65 
Available documents suggest that these requests met with some success. 
Churches, monasteries, and their administrators increased their lands, 
thus reducing the area available to support civil and military authority 
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and ultimately requiring the peasant population to produce more. Although 
less easy to document, one can speculate that elite households expanded 
also, as the weakest of the household economies failed and desperate 
peasant farmers sought succor with their local elite. 
By the 1920s, the opportunities for migration expanded, just as the 
intensity of "push" factors increased. Besides the opportunities to join 
the developing political economy of the new empire-state in the south, 
northern Ethiopians also were able to participate in the growing colonial 
economies of Sudan and Eritrea which afforded opportunities for trade and 
wage labor paid in cash which the northern Ethiopia's sluggish rural 
economy did not. To date, historians have not investigated the extent to 
which large numbers of northern Ethiopians migrated into adjacent 
colonial economies for wage labor. Most of this movement constituted 
"target labor," since those who left home did so not for emigration, but 
as a means of obtaining the wherewithall to reinvest their earnings in 
their local rural economy through the purchase of oxen, seed, or even 
land. 
Given the nature of the sources, it is often difficult to determine 
the points of origin of the "Abyssinian" labor which presented itself in 
Eritrean or Sudanese development schemes. Certainly a preponderance must 
have originated in adjacent zones like Tigre and Gondar, but Lastans and 
Gojjames participated as well. As early as 1911 Sudan intelligence 
sources reported that the dom nut forests around Kassala were filled with 
day-laborers - mostly "Abyssinians" - who earned as much as ten piastres 
a day for their collections. 66 Labor migration from northern Ethiopia 
was also considerable around the eastern Sudanese town of Gedaref which 
by 1935 had a permanent "Abyssinian" population of 1000 who lived in the 
quarter called ''medina al Habash" (lit. the Ethiopian city). Women had 
joined the emigration: many of Gedaref' s and Khartoum/Omdurman's 
Ethiopian population were Amhara and Tigrean prostitutes popular in 
Sudan. In addition to this permanent population, an annual influx of 
northern Ethiopians occured during the time of the dura (sorghum) 
harvest.67 
A similar movement took place towards Eritrea where Italian efforts 
to develop cash and food crop production required a skilled agricultural 
labor force. Major centers for agricultural wage labor were at the Gash 
river project in the west and at the experimental agricultural station at 
Fagrena where cotton and coffee projects were underway.68 Similarly, 
"Abyssinian" labor engaged in road-building, housing construction, and 
especially the military activities which sustained the coercive power of 
the colonial state. In 1912, an official British delegation estimated the 
annual influx of northern Ethiopian labor into Eritrea at 12,000, few of 
whom remained permanently.69 
Probably the single most important form of "target labor" of northern 
Ethiopians in Eritrea was service in Libya with the Eritrean and Italian 
armies where they made up well over half of the troops used to pacify 
rebellions in Cyrenaica and the Fezzan between 1911 and 1931. During 
those years, over a quarter-million northern Ethiopians served in Libya. 
In 1918 alone, Count Colli of the Italian legation in Addis Ababa 
reported that 18,000 "Abyssinians" were serving in the Eritrean army and 
another 30,000 fought as a part of Italian army in Tripoli. 70 Many of 
these "Abyssinians" were Tigrean or Gojjame, but a fair number came from 
Wag, Lasta proper, and other areas of the north. Italian agents working 
in Tigre without the consent of the central government recruited large 
numbers of young men. Piacentini claimed to have signed up 5000-6000 
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during one trip in 1922. But most arrived in Asmara on their own 
volition, attracted by the prospects of earning a salary, obtaining 
clothing, and arms just for fighting the "Araba" of "Trimboli. 1171 
The motivations of the young men who traveled to Eritrea and later to 
Tripoli varied considerably, but it is clear from extant evidence and 
interviews that few planned to or did remain. Certainly the adventure of 
traveling to a distant land to fight Muslims enticed many highlanders. 
But the major motivation would seem to have been the desire to collect 
the means to survive and reproduce in the rural economy which 
increasingly required outside income and start-up capital. 
Attracted by the stories of those who had successfully returned, 
young men from all over the north left the rural economy to take up arms 
for pay. Those that escaped the high rate of death from dysentery, 
seasickness, and Sanusi attacks returned home with cash, arms, the means 
of production, and an important skill, Returnees from Libya occupied 
important places in both local and state administration. Moreover, their 
cash income also ended up back in the rural economy in the form of 
bribes, taxes, and extortions by local officials. Ras Haylu of Gojjam, 
Ras Siyum of Tigre, and the local officials of Lasta demanded cash fees 
from those who returned from Tripoli service,72 In the declining 
conditions of production in the north, and in Lasta and Tigre in 
particular, however, this source of capital and income was only a 
temporary palliative, 
For most Lastans who chose to or were forced to leave Lasta's rural 
society, however, southern Ethiopia provided the greatest attraction. 
There, the Shawan conquest had made productive land available for those 
who were willing to leave the subsistence cycle and attach themselves to 
the extended household (or court) of the military officials who governed 
southern regions, One generation earlier, the Shawan and northern 
Ethiopia soldiers who had followed Menilek had obtained their reward in 
the form of huge tracts of land and the labor of indigenous cultivators 
and slaves. During the 1920-1935 period when many Lasta farmers found 
life in their home regions untenable, the coffee economy of the south was 
flourishing. In the south, a few years of service usually yielded a land 
grant, a title, and a status far beyond what would have been possible in 
the north where stratification had become more and more rigid. Lastans 
claimed to me that the same amount of labor on virgin southern land as 
had been invested in the depleted soils of Lasta yielded many times the 
produce. True or not, Lastans believed it to be so, The availability of 
gabbar (serf) labor made a huge difference as well, 
Lastans who emigrated south in the 1916-1935 period found a previous 
generation of Lastans already well established, willing to accept their 
services, and able to provide them with land, labor, and access to the 
coercive power of the state. Merely by being Amharic-speaking and 
Christian, Lastans enjoyed a social status far beyond what would have 
been possible in Lasta itself, Lasta landlords, while fewer than other 
groups, were nonetheless spread over much of the south, One of Wagshum 
Berru's aides had established himself in Wallaga, a large branch of Lasta 
nobility was in Harar, and Ras Kassa had huge tracts of land in Arsi and 
southern Shawa which he sold or gave to his northern followers, The rural 
population in Lasta seems to have been well aware of which of their 
compatriots had successfully moved south, providing opportunity for 
others to do the same,73 
As each succeeding ecological 
Lastans chose to abandon the rural 
or political crisis 
cycle of subsistence 
unfolded, more 
or at least to 
21 
try and supplement it with an out~ide source of income in wage labor, 
petty trade, or dependency on a richer neighbor. At the base of the 
breakdown of the rural economy was the inability of individual households 
in poor and middle ranks successfully to reproduce themselves. Informants 
who had been a part of the process accounted for their emigration by 
describing both the attractions of the emerging commodity production of 
the south and the difficulty of conditions in places like Lasta. 
Certainly the former played an important role in feeding Lastans into the 
national economy, but, overall, the decline of conditions in Lasta must 
have been decisive. 
The evidence available on rural society in Lasta during 1900-1935 
points directly to the impoverishment of the household economy and the 
erosion of a rural production system whose technical base, systems of 
resource allocation, and social structure had proved extremely resilient 
over a number of centuries. The new intervention of the state in the 
1916-1935 period was critical in precipitating the process of economic 
decline by placing new pressures on the limited resources of land, labor, 
and produce. Moreover, by introducing collections in cash and stimulating 
the commoditization of land and labor, the state had served as the 
primary agent for the introduction of the world economy in the region. If 
the penetration of the world system into the rural north was less than in 
southern Ethiopia, it nevertheless precipitated changes in rural society 
which pushed northern Ethiopians out of their homelands and into the 
modern Ethiopian social formation. 
By 1935, well before the ecological calamities of the 1960s and 
1970s, the Lasta rural economy had proven incapable of supporting a 
population of independent and self-reproducing peasant households. In 
these conditions, Lasta's contribution to the growth of the modern 
Ethiopian nation has been primarily a steady flow of emigrants hoping to 
find a place in a new national economic and political structure. To a 
large degree many of them succeeded in parlaying their cultural heritage 
and linguistic affinity to the holders of power in the central state into 
a more viable life in the center and south of the country. 
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Notes 
*This research was part of a 21 month project carried out in 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Britain, and Italy with support from the Social Science 
Research Council and Fulbright Hays. Interviews in Ethiopia were carried 
out from January through September 1982 in two migrant communities, one 
on the outskirts of Addis Ababa and another in Nazret. 
1Households in Lasta in this period may be described as corporate 
small-holder farm units in which the members have pooled labor, land 
rights, and property. Kinship was a common, but not essential, element 
determining membership. Economic decisions were made on the basis of the 
members' collective interests. For a fuller description of the northern 
Ethiopian household and its use here, see James Mc Cann, "Households, 
Peasants, and Rural History in Lasta, Northern Ethiopia 1900-1935," 
(Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1983); Dan F. Bauer, 
Household and Society in Ethiopia (East Lansing, 1977); Allan Hoben, 
"Family, Land, and Class in Northwest Europe and Northern Ethiopia," 
Proceedings of the First United States Conference on Ethio ian Studies 
(East Lansing, 1975 ; and Vinigi Grottanelli, Missione de studi al Lago 
Tana (Rome, 1939). All four of these studies point to the importance of 
the northern Ethiopian household as a political and economic unit where 
kinship in the actual production process played a relatively minor role. 
2Reports on the extension of central government authority over 
customs collection in Tigre, Wallo, and other areas of the north are 
found in Rome in the Archivo Storico delle Ministero Africana Italiana 
(hereafter ASMAI) 54/4, 54/5, and 54/36. Also see Brielli Report for 
16-30 September 1933, ASMA! 54/6. Richard Pankhurst, Economic History of 
Ethiopia (Addis Ababa, 1968), 524. Carlo Annaratone, In Abissinia (Rome, 
1914), 125. Chakola Lamma, interview tf2, 17 March 1982. Copies of all 
interview notes and tapes have been deposited at the Institute of 
Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa University. 
3Document ff256 of the manuscript "Ya Ras Kassa Astadadar Damb" 
admonishes local officials for their inefficiencies. This manuscript 
consists of over 400 separate administrative documents: decrees, 
appointments, tax collection procedures, land grants, and administrative 
directives issued by Ras Kassa between 1919 and 1935. With the help of my 
research assistant Dagnachew Tefera and my colleague Tesema Ta' a I have 
indexed and translated most of the 400 documents (and all of those 
relating to Lasta). The original document was lent to me by Fitawrari 
Nabiyaleul Takla Sadeq who served for many years as Ras Kassa's personal 
secretary and confidant. I have a photocopy of this 300-page manuscript 
in my possession and have deposited an additional copy in the Institute 
of Ethiopian Studies. 
4rbid., documents #94 and #49. Asras Walda Mikael, interview #2, 21 
April 1982. Trends in central government taxation reform policy can be 
seen in the taxation data found in the Frank de Halpert papers at Rhodes 
House, Oxford • 
5nya Ras Kassa Astadadar," document ffo99. Fit. Nabiyaleul, interview 
#5, 23 August 1982. An elected local official called the chiqashum 
supervised assessments in each land division in conjunction with state 
scribes and supervisors. Among other procedures, Kassa ordered all tax 
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payers to use notched sticks which kept a record of assessments and 
payments understandable to the illiterate, thus making overassessment by 
local officials more difficult. The ras also maximized state market 
receipts by forbidding the selling oflivestock outside of designated 
market places covered by state assessors. See "Ya Ras Kassa Astadadar," 
document /"236. 
6see for example, "Ya Ras Kassa Astadadar," documents /"221, ftl02, 
and ffl02b. 
7rbid., document #35. 
8Ibid., documents ffll3, ft89, ff91. Although most land continued to 
be distributed through the rest land tenure system, the state retained 
the right to allocate rights of collection (gult) to its functionaries. 
It also controlled plots of state land (hudad) which carried with them 
obligations by local peasants to cultivate, sow, and harvest. In Lasta, 
Ras Kassa's documents make it clear that he also exercised the right to 
reapportion lands granted to military and church officials. 
9rbid., document #151. 
lOu such accommodation did not often happen, it was at least the 
perception among producers that it could and should. Interviews, passim. 
In a number of cases, the rural population sent petitions to state 
representatives requesting to be taxed in "the old way." See "Ya Ras 
Kassa Astadadar," document ftlOl-102; Querrolo to Astuto, l December 1931, 
ASMAI 54/37; and Paulicelli to Mdis Ababa, 29 January 1922, ASMAI 54/36. 
11 Abba Getu Endasaw, interview ffo4, 25 May 1982. Mahetma Sellase 




relative to salt, see 
"Nel piano del sale," Bollettino della Societa 
48 (1911), 170. For figures on prices of silver 
Pankhurst, Economic History, 463. 
l3Mahetma Sellase, "Land," 291. 
14Pollera to Mdis Ababa, 20 August 1919, ASMAI 54/8. 
15Andalem Mulaw, "Bagemdir and Simien (1900-1930)" (B.A. thesis, 
Haile Sellassie I University, 1971), 28. Paulicelli to Addis Ababa, 24 
October 1921, ASMAI 54/36. Chakola, interview #3, 6 May 1982. Abba Getu, 
interview #4, 25 May 1982. Kassa's delay in imposing such a tax probably 
derived from the fact that he had other revenue-generating governates to 
the south-Haylu and Gugsa did not. The timing and coincidence of hut or 
head taxes in colonial policies elsewhere in Africa, but the possibility 
should not be ruled out. Both were astute observers of British policy in 
Sudan. 
16Pollera Report, 8 February 1922, ASMAI 54/36. 
17 Abba Alamaraw, interview f"2, 14 June 1982. Asras Walda Mikael was 
one of these. He lived at Ras Kassa's court in Addis Ababa and served as 
treasurer while holding t.he title and privileges or meslane. Ras Haylu of 
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trade in the capital where he reputedly owned over 250 houses, a bunna 
bet, and several taxis. See Zoli to Ministero delle Colonie, 11 April 
1930, ASMAI 54/5. 
18Alamu Warqnah, interview ifo2, 22 April 1982; Abba Getu, interview 
#4, 25 May 1982; Chakola, interview #1, 10 March 1983. 
19Chakola interview #1, 10 March 1982. 
20chakola interview ifal 10 March 1982; Asras interview ifo2, 21 April 
1982. Mashumiya was an increasingly common practice during 1900-1935 and 
a number of my informants commented on it. For nineteenth-century 
citations, see Crummey, "Abyssinian Feudalism, 11 12 7, when the requirement 
was simply a gift and not a cash payment for office. 
2l"Ya Ras Kassa As tadadar," passim. Alamu Warqnah, interview i1'4, 14 
May 1982. Brielli Report, 16-30 September 1933, ASMAI 54/6. In 1928, the 
newly appointed Negus Tafari issued a proclamation forbidding the 
confiscation of land by rural elites. See Berhanna Salam, 15 Tekemt 1921 
E.C. 
22rhis was true for Gojjam, Bagamder, Lasta, and Tigre. Chakola, 
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23Brielli Report, 22 June - 20 July 1933, ASMAI 54/6. The Italian 
report mentions a per capita assessment of taler, but one taler per 
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ASMAI 54/ 5 for example of similar fine imposed by the Wagshum for an 
attack on mail carriers. 
24"Ya Ras Kassa Astadadar," document /"151; Abba Getu, interview 
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26Chakola, interview #1, 10 March 1982. 
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of James 
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28Ibid. 53. My chart has been adapted from Scott's with some 
additionsregarding the Ethiopian case. 
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